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This Note is about the recent New Jersey Supreme Court 
case, Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, and how other courts 
should adopt its holding of allowing all reasonably certain and 
calculable benefits to be considered in determining partial 
takings just compensation. Furthermore, it addresses the impact 
that the decision will have on environmental takings and its 
importance to the future of both property and environmental law. 
 
Table of Contents 
 
I. Introduction ............................................................................ 553 
II. History of Eminent Domain .................................................. 555 
III. Calculation of Just Compensation ....................................... 560 
A. Theoretical Conception of Just Compensation .................. 560 
B. Value Plus Damage Method ............................................... 562 
C. Before-and-After Method .................................................... 564 
D. Defining Special and General Benefits .............................. 566 
IV. Impact on Environmental Takings ...................................... 573 
V. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan ..................................... 576 
VI. Proposed Change and Its Effects ......................................... 582 
VII. Arguments and Alternatives .............................................. 584 
VIII. Conclusion ......................................................................... 591 
 
                                                          
*
 Scott Salmon (salmon.s@law.wlu.edu) is a J.D. candidate at 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 2015, and the Executive 
Managing Editor of the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment. Scott 
would like to thank Professor Jill Fraley for advising him on this Note. He 
would like to thank his parents, Jon and Meryl Salmon, and his sisters, Dr. 
Barie Salmon, and Dr. Tracy Salmon, for their love and support. 




“In a partial-takings case, homeowners are entitled to the 
fair market value of their loss, not to a windfall.1 
 
 -Justice Barry T. Albin, Supreme Court of New Jersey 
 
Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, colloquially known as the Takings Clause, the 
federal government may take private property for public use 
through the doctrine of eminent domain, provided that the owner 
is reimbursed with “just compensation.”2 The calculation of this 
compensation is generally dictated by statute, which differs by 
jurisdiction and type of taking.3 
Unfortunately, most methods of calculation currently in 
practice hinder government partial takings for environmental 
purposes, because the costs are unfairly weighted towards the 
landowner.4 For example, if the government wishes to use its 
eminent domain authority to condemn a section of an individual’s 
property to replenish a beach, build a dam, or raise a windmill, 
the intangible benefits of the project to the public are generally 
not considered in calculating the compensation to the landowner.5  
As a result of the inability to calculate such benefits, the 
proposed project may be prohibitively costly for the government 
with no financial offset for the benefits.6 As the general goal of 
                                                          
1. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 527 (N.J. 
2013). 
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 2.18, cmt. h 
(2000) (“Federal and state constitutions require that the servitude be acquired 
for some public purpose and that just compensation be paid.”); see also infra 
Part III for a more detailed discussion of calculation methods. 
4. See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 527 (stating that in a formula 
used to determine damages of a partial taking, the court did not consider the 
benefits of that increased the value of the remaining property in a partial 
taking).  
5. See id. at 535–36 (citing prior cases where any benefit to the 
landowner as a result of he taking is not considered in calculating the amount of 
compensation due to the landowner).  
6. See infra note 218 and accompanying text. [Press release, 
Jerry Patterson] 
  6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 2 (2015) 554 
eminent domain compensation serves to make the property owner 
whole,7 these calculations are by definition focused on benefitting 
the private individual rather than the condemnor, the public 
acting through the government.8 
The failure of most compensation models to account for 
general public benefits may make an environmental enterprise 
impossible for the government if the compensation costs are 
unreasonably high. 9  This Note argues for modifying partial 
takings jurisprudence in the mold of the recent New Jersey 
Supreme Court decision, Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 
such that just compensation to private owners would be 
calculated using the before-and-after method, offset by both 
reasonably calculable general and special benefits.10 
First, this Note will set the stage for the current 
understanding of takings jurisprudence by discussing the history 
of eminent domain. 11  Then, this note will go deeper into a 
discussion of eminent domain and how just compensation is 
actually calculated in partial takings, by exploring the various 
methods and manners of calculation.12 It will then look at how 
these calculations affect environmental takings13 before looking 
at the specific case of Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan.14 The 
decision forms the basis of the proposed modification to takings 
jurisprudence that this Note advocates.15 Finally, this Note will 
                                                          
7. See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 224 (2014) 
(“[C]ompensation should be designed to place the owner in a position as good as, 
but not better than, the position the owner is in before the taking occurs.”). 
8. See id. (describing that compensation should reimburse a 
landowner to the full extent of their loss). 
9. See infra note 218 and accompanying text. [Press release, 
Jerry Patterson]. 
10. See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 526–27 (“We now conclude that 
when a public project requires the partial taking of property, ‘just compensation’ 
to the owner must be based on a consideration of all relevant, reasonably 
calculable, and non-conjectural factors that either decrease or increase the value 
of the remaining property.”). 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. See infra Part V. 
15. See id. at 384 (holding that the just compensation calculation 
must include benefits that homeowners obtained from storm protection that a 
constructed dune provided). 
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look at the proposed change and its effects, along with the 
opinions of both advocates and detractors.16 
 
II. History of Eminent Domain 
 
In 1897, the Supreme Court incorporated the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 17  which meant that the just 
compensation requirement of eminent domain applied to the 
states, in addition to the federal government.18  The Court held in 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago 
that: 
  
[the] judgment of a state court, even if it be 
authorized by statute, whereby private property is 
taken for the state or under its direction for public 
use, without compensation made or secured to the 
owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in 
the due process of law required by the fourteenth 
amendment of the constitution [sic] of the United 
States.19 
 
Chicago involved the taking of land by private individuals, along 
with the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company for the 
purpose of widening a road.20 In that instance, the Court awarded 
a nominal amount of $1 to the condemnees, which they found 
constituted just compensation. 21  As a result of the Supreme 
Court’s decision, when a state or a local jurisdiction decides to use 
their eminent domain authority, they must not only provide the 
                                                          
16. See infra Parts VI and VII.  
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of . . . property, without due process of law.”). 
18. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 241 (1897) (affirming that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment extends just compensation obligations to the states). 
19. Id.  
20. See id. at 230 (explaining that the city of Chicago petitioned to 
the circuit court of Cook county for the condemnation of  land for the 
improvement and sought just compensation for private property taken or 
damaged). 
21. See id. (noting that the jury determined $1 to be just 
compensation for the railroad company’s portion of the right of way). 
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same procedural due process the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires, but must also provide just compensation, even if the 
appropriate amount is merely a nominal fee.22 
Until 1922, courts interpreted the Takings Clause literally 
as it was written, so property had to be physically taken for 
public uses to qualify under the doctrine of eminent domain.23 In 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Supreme Court expanded 
the definition of takings by holding that regulation of property 
beyond a certain point constitutes a regulatory taking and 
required just compensation.24 
In that matter, the Kohler Act prohibited mining that 
would cause subsidence of homes and surfaces near residential 
properties.25 The Pennsylvania Coal Company proceeded to mine 
underneath the homes based on the explicit terms of the deeds to 
the homes, which only granted the landowners the rights to the 
surface, and not the ground beneath their land.26 The contractual 
agreement through the deeds conflicted with the Kohler Act, so 
the Court found that the statute’s regulatory powers necessarily 
constituted a taking because they were so restricting upon the 
Pennsylvania Coal Company’s rights as owner the land beneath 
the property.27 
                                                          
22. See id. at 247 (stating that the state court has a duty to guard 
and protect the constitutional right of due process enjoined by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
23. See JOSEPH W. SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 678 (2d ed. 
2005) (“Before 1922, the takings clause was interpreted fairly literally. A taking 
would be found when a state or the federal government exercised its eminent 
domain power to take property for public uses.”). 
24. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) 
(“The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”). 
25. See id. at 416–17 (“The Kohler Act prohibits, under certain 
conditions, the mining of anthracite coal within the limits of a city in such a 
manner or to such an extent ‘as to cause the . . . subsidence of . . . any dwelling 
or other structure used as a human habitation, or any factory, store, or other 
industrial or mercantile establishment in which human labor is employed.’”) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
26. See id. at 412 (“The deed conveys the surface but in express 
terms reserves the right to remove all the coal under the same and the grantee 
takes the premises with the risk and waives all claim for damages that may 
arise from mining out the coal.”). 
27. See id. at 414 (“It is our opinion that the act cannot be 
sustained as an exercise of the police power, so far as it affects the mining of 
 
NECESSARY CHANGE 557 
As the Court stated, “The general rule at least is that 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”28 Regulations that 
essentially deprive landowners of their property rights thus 
qualify as a regulatory taking.29 After Pennsylvania Coal Co., a 
taking could be either physical or regulatory, both of which would 
require just compensation.30 
Eminent domain jurisprudence changed significantly 
again in 1978 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, which called for an ad hoc 
determination of various factors in considering whether or not a 
regulatory taking has occurred. 31  In this case, the landowner 
owned Grand Central Terminal and wanted to build a multistory 
office building on top. 32  However, the terminal had been 
designated a landmark under New York’s Landmark 
Preservation Law. 33  The landmark status of the building 
prevented such construction, so the owner sued, alleging that the 
restrictive nature of the statute constituted a regulatory taking 
which demanded just compensation under the Takings Clause.34 
                                                                                                                                      
coal under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has been 
reserved.”). 
28. See id. at 415. 
29. See SINGER, supra note 23, at 680 (“Justice Holmes reasoned 
[in Pennsylvania Coal] that regulations that deprive owners of the value of their 
property were as harmful to the legal rights and justified expectations of owners 
as outright seizure of their land.”). 
30. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (stating that if a 
regulation goes too far then it is a taking and the constitutional way of paying 
for the change must be upheld).  
31. See SINGER, supra note 23,  at 687 (“Instead of a clear rule, the 
Court engages in ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries’ into the ‘particular 
circumstances’ of the case . . . .”); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries, the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have 
particular significance.”). 
32. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104 (“[A]ppellant Penn Central 
entered into a lease with appellant UGP Properties, whereby UGP was to 
construct a multistory office building over the Terminal.”). 
33. See id. (“Under the Landmarks Law, the Grand Central 
Terminal (Terminal), which is owned by the Penn Central Transportation Co. 
and its affiliates (Penn Central) was designated a “landmark” and the block it 
occupies a ‘landmark site.’”). 
34. See id. (“[A]ppellants brought suit in state court claiming that 
the application of the Landmarks Law had “taken” their property without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
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The Court ruled that the ad hoc factors to be considered 
included the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” 
and the extent of the government’s regulatory interference, 
among others.35 As a result, it took a holistic view in considering 
whether or not a regulatory taking had occurred, and looked at 
the substance rather than the form of the regulations.36  
Although this Note does not focus on regulatory takings, 
there is currently an enormous amount of discussion about the 
subject in conjunction with environmental issues relating to land 
conservation, wetlands management, endangered species, 
mining, and industrial air pollution, making the subject relevant 
in a corollary manner.37 
The most recent major development in complete takings 
law came in 2005 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. 
City of New London, in which the Court held that the government 
may transfer private property to another private party, with 
proper compensation, and qualify as a legitimate public taking.38 
Furthermore, the defining characteristic seemingly emphasized 
by Justice Stevens was the “public purpose” of the taking: 
“Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, 
reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative 
judgments . . . .”39  Kelo was concerned primarily with complete 
                                                                                                                                      
arbitrarily deprived them of their property without due process of law in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
35. See id. at 124 (describing the specific significant ad hoc factors 
of relevant consideration). 
36. See id. (acknowledging that the Court has been “unable to 
develop any ‘set formula’”). 
37. See Jennifer Koons, Supreme Court’s Regulatory Takings Case 
Draws Widespread Interest, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/10/06/06greenwire-supreme-courts-
regulatory-takings-case-draws-w-78107.html  (noting the widespread interest 
from then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan, attorney generals from twenty-six 
states, the National Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, the 
U.S. Conference of Mayors, and others, in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. 
Florida, a regulatory takings case that involved a plan to create a state-owned 
public beach between private waterfront land and the Gulf of Mexico) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
38. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) 
(holding that the city’s exercise of eminent domain power on ground takings met 
the constitutional “public use” requirement). 
39. See id. at 480 (rejecting a narrow test for the universal test to 
determine public purpose). 
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takings, and the specific question has not come before the 
Supreme Court with regards to partial takings, so it is unclear if 
the Court would view the public purpose requirement as broadly 
and necessary as in partial takings.40  However, the lack of a 
distinction made in Kelo between types of takings would indicate 
the requirement would apply similarly to partial takings.41 
The only significant federal case addressing partial 
takings is Bauman v. Ross, which came before the Supreme Court 
soon after the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City 
of Chicago decision in 1897.42 In that matter, the Court dealt with 
the expansion of Washington, D.C. and the necessity of partially 
taking property under eminent domain to build the streets of the 
city. 43  Justice Horace Gray wrote of the constitutionality of 
partial takings, and that in calculating compensation, for federal 
purposes, only special benefits may be set off from the 
compensation award, and not general benefits.44 This distinction 
is discussed in more detail in Section III, but it fits within the 
majority view of the subject.45 
From the time the Fifth Amendment was ratified in 1791 
to the Kelo decision in 2005, courts have changed the accepted 
                                                          
40. See id. at 479 (noting that the public use test was difficult to 
administer because the definition of public use was unclear on the issue of 
public purpose). 
41. See id. at 480 (reaffirming the broad interpretation of public 
use as “public purpose”).   
42. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 561 (1897) (“[A] jury of 
seven was summoned . . . and the introduction of evidence by the petitioners 
and by the respondents, rendered a verdict, in the form prescribed by the court, 
setting forth a description of each parcel of land affected, the number of square 
feet in the parcel, the number of square feet taken, the number of square feet 
not taken . . . .”). 
43. See id. at 550 (“Congress accordingly, by the act of August 27, 
1888 (chapter 916), entitled ‘An act to regulate the subdivision of land within 
the District of Columbia,’ authorized the commissioners of the District of 
Columbia to make and publish general orders regulating the platting and 
subdividing of all lands and grounds in the District . . . .”). 
44. See id. at 581–82 (“We, of course, exclude the indirect and 
general benefits which result to the public as a whole . . . But, if the proposed 
road or other improvement inure to the direct and special benefit of the 
individual out of whose property a part is taken, he receives something which 
none else of the public receive, and it is just that this should be taken into 
account in determining what is compensation.”). 
45. See infra Part III.D (providing a more detailed discussion of 
special and general benefits). 
  6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 2 (2015) 560 
interpretation of the Takings Clause in a staggered manner from 
a literal interpretation to a much more complex tool that can be 
used for public use and private individuals through varying 
methods.46 
 
III. Calculation of Just Compensation 
 
A. Theoretical Conception of Just Compensation 
 
When the government takes an entire property either 
physically or through regulation, the just compensation owed to 
the condemnee is calculated by a simple appraisal of the property 
to determine its fair market value, which is then paid to them by 
the government. 47  For a complete taking, the Takings Clause 
does not require compensation for anything other than the taken 
property, not even consequential or future damages. 48  As the 
Supreme Court said in Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 
the Fifth Amendment “merely requires that an owner of property 
taken should be paid for what is taken from him.”49 
However, the simple compensation rule for complete 
takings does not extend to partial takings, where the government 
seeks only a section of the privately owned property.50 A typical 
example would be if the government condemned a strip of land 
within a larger plot to build a highway.51 This would constitute a 
                                                          
46. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (noting that public use jurisprudence 
changed from rigid formulas to favoring an approach giving legislatures broad 
latitude). 
47. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY 539 (3d ed. 2000) (“In the usual kind of taking case [a complete 
taking] . . . the remedy is monetary damages . . . measured by the owner’s loss, 
the fair market value of the land . . . .”). 
48. See BARLOW BURKE, ANN M. BURKHART & R.H. HELMHOLZ, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW 747 (3d ed. 2010) (“For example, the Takings 
Clause does not require compensation for consequential damages, such as 
relocation costs.”). 
49. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 
(1910). 
50. See 1 LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 47 (2d ed. 1953) (describing the various scenarios in which a partial 
taking may be confused with a complete taking). 
51. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Nickerson, 578 
S.W.2d 916 (Mo. 1979) (illustrating an example of a partial taking). 
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partial conveyance, whereas the condemning the entire plot of 
land to construct a nature preserve would be a complete taking.52  
Determining the value of a partially taken property brings 
difficult questions.53 If the piece taken contains the majority of 
the value of the property, or if the remaining property is 
worthless without the section that was taken, valuation becomes 
a balancing test of different factors with no precise answer.54 If a 
partial taking will increase the value of the remaining property 
instead of decreasing it, that presents problems because an 
individual should not be expected to pay the government for the 
privilege of having their property taken.55 As a result, there are a 
number of issues facing any calculation that must be addressed 
in a proposed formula.  
Although a variety of methods have been postulated,56 as a 
matter of practice, there are two principal methods of calculating 
just compensation in partial takings.57 The first method, known 
as “value plus damage” (“VPD”), calculates the value of the part 
taken, plus any damages to the remainder. 58  Currently, a 
majority of jurisdictions use VPD.59 The second method, known as 
“before-and-after” (“BAA”), takes the difference between the fair 
market value of the entire property before and after the taking, 
                                                          
52. See Dep’t of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Keller, 335 N.E.2d 443, 
446 (Ill. 1975) (illustrating such an example as a complete taking). 
53. See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 526–27 
(N.J. 2013) (stating that the Court must consider all “relevant, reasonably 
calculable, and non-conjectural factors” to determine the value of the remaining 
property). 
54. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Gunnels, 340 S.E.2d 12, 15 (Ga. 1986) 
(“A partial taking (hypothetically, of a narrow strip) might indeed render a 
remainder, still within the ownership of the condemnee, nearly worthless.”). 
55. See United States v. 101.88 Acres of Land, 616 F.2d 762, 769 
(5th Cir. 1980) (“If, instead, the taking increases the value of the remainder, the 
increment in value may be set off against the compensation awarded for the 
land condemned.”). 
56. See ORGEL, supra note 50, § 48 (listing three possible 
formulae). But see AM. JUR. supra note 7, § 373 (listing four possible formulae). 
57. See ORGEL, supra note 50, §§ 50–51 (describing the “value plus 
damage” method and the “before-and-after” method). 
58. See id. § 52 (describing the application of the VPD formula in 
case law). 
59. See id. § 50 (“This formula is perhaps more often used than 
any other.”); see also AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 324 (“In most states, the 
condemnee’s compensation for a partial taking is calculated under some 
variation of the ‘value plus damage’ rule . . . .”). 
  6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 2 (2015) 562 
minus any benefits to the property as a result.60 Both methods 
are composed of two steps, which will be discussed in more detail 
below.  
 
B. Value Plus Damage Method 
 
The finder of fact calculates VPD through two steps.61 The 
first step requires the valuation of the piece of property taken.62 
This usually involves hearing testimony from appraisal experts 
and other forms of extrinsic evidence. 63  Following the initial 
valuation, the second step is to add the value of any damages to 
the remaining part of land, which may be offset by special 
benefits.64 
The valued damages to the remainder of the property are 
known as “severance damages.”65 Severance damages are broadly 
defined as “the depreciation in the ‘market value’ (or ‘fair market 
value’) of the remainder resulting from, or due to, the taking of 
that portion of the owner’s property that is expropriated.”66 As 
one court stated, “[s]everance damage in an expropriation case 
may be defined as a diminution in the value of the landowner's 
remaining, unexpropriated property.”67 If the government were to 
condemn part of an individual’s property to take an easement for 
the construction of a natural gas pipeline and this were to 
increase the difficulty of developing or selling the remaining land, 
                                                          
60. See ORGEL, supra note 50, § 51 (introducing the basic 
components of the BAA formula). 
61. See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 324 (“[T]he condemnee should 
receive compensation equal to the total of: (1) the value of the property actually 
taken, and (2) any net damages to the property remaining, after offsetting 
special benefits to the remaining property.”). 
62. See id. (listing the first step of calculating under VPD). 
63. See id. § 229 (explaining methods used to determine the 
valuation of the property). 
64. See id. § 324 (listing the second step of calculating under VPD); 
see also infra Part III.D (providing a more detailed discussion of special 
benefits). 
65.  See SINGER, supra note 23, at 750 (“The reduction in the value 
of the remaining [property] is called severance damages.”).  
66.  ORGEL, supra note 50, § 53.  
67.  See State Dept. of Transp. and Dev. v. Regard, 567 So. 2d 1174, 
1176 (La. Ct. App. 1990). 
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the value of these damages will increase the intrinsic value of the 
taken property as a measure of severance damages.68 
Furthermore, “[w]hatever is reasonably certain to follow 
as an incident to such construction and operation, which in an 
appreciable degree depreciates the value of the remaining land, is 
a proper element of damages to be considered by the jury in 
arriving at its verdict.” 69  Courts have held that severance 
damages must “proximately arise” as a consequence of the 
taking.70 There is wide acceptance of the importance that every 
type of damage may be considered.71 Courts have held that there 
should be broad admissibility of evidence,72 and that “[a] court 
may consider all factors indicative of the value of the property, 
and which would have been present in the minds of a willing 
buyer and a willing seller.”73 
Courts have also been clear that the damages admitted 
must be real and may not be “too speculative or remote,” which 
would make them “not a necessary, natural, or proximate result 
of the taking.”74 If the possibility of a specific damage may occur 
but is unlikely, the value of such damages may not be considered 
in the final valuation of just compensation.75 
                                                          
68.  See Portland Natural Gas Transp. Sys. v. 19.2 Acres of Land, 
318 F.3d 279, 284 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Requirements supports the court’s 
determination that [it] would decrease the price a reasonable buyer was willing 
to pay. . . . [T]he encumbered land may not be used for structure, storage, or 
trees. . . . [A] landowner must submit proposed plans to the Pipeline Companies 
for authorization before beginning any work on or near the easement.”). 
69.  Idaho & W. Ry. Co. v. Coey, 131 P. 810, 810 (Wash. 1913). 
70.  See Cent. Ga. Power Co. v. May, 72 S.E. 900, 901 (Ga. 1911) 
(“The measure of such consequential damages is the diminution in the market 
value of the remainder of the property proximately arising from the causes just 
mentioned.”). 
71.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7 § 224 (“[I]t is proper to consider all 
factors indicative of the value of the property and which would have been 
present in the minds of a willing buyer and a willing seller if the peroperty were 
offered in a free market exchange.”). 
72.  See United States v. L.E. Cooke Co., 991 F.2d 336, 341 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (“[Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 702 should be broadly interpreted on 
the basis of whether the use of expert testimony will assist the trier of fact.”). 
73.  Kurth v. Iowa Dept. of Trans., 628 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 
2001)(citing 26 AM. JUR. 2D, Eminent Domain § 294 (1996)). 
74.  See id. (noting that a jury can consider things that may entice 
a buyer to purchase the property) (citing 26 AM. JUR. 2D, Eminent Domain § 294 
(1996)). 
75.  See ORGEL, supra note 50, § 59 (describing how potential, 
speculative, and remote damages may not be considered); see also AM. JUR. 
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Finally, any benefits or increase in value to the remaining 
property may not be subtracted from the compensation for the 
taken property as part of the first step.76 If a hypothetical new 
highway would increase the value of a farm due to easier export 
of crops, for example, that value may not be used to offset the 
valuation of the property taken. 77  At most, benefits to the 
remainder “may be deducted from the consequential or severance 
damages.”78 If the benefits so completely overwhelm the damages, 
“the condemnor does not have to provide compensation for any 
severance damages.”79  But even if the severance damages are 
completely negated by the listed benefits, the initial valuation of 
the property taken may not be touched; that amount is 
guaranteed to the condemnee.80 
 
C. Before-and-After Method 
 
Although the majority of jurisdictions do not use BAA,81 
there are some specific advantages to the method over VPD, 
                                                                                                                                      
supra note 7, § 281 (“While severance damages may be awarded for real 
diminution of value sustained by a remainder, recovery may not be based on 
speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent, or merely possible events.”). 
76.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 324 (“Under the value plus 
damage rule, a property owner must receive just compensation for the entire 
value of the part of the land that is taken, regardless of the fact that the 
remaining land is benefitted by the project.”); see also Alabama Power Co. v. 
1354.02 Acres, More or Less, of Land in Randolph County, Ala., 709 F.2d 666, 
668 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[T[here is a distinction . . . between the land taken and 
the land remaining. The property owner must receive ‘just compensation’ for 
condemned property, without regard to any enhancement of the remaining land. 
Damage to remaining land...may be offset by enhancement in the value of 
that land.”). 
77. See Ivy Inn, Inc., v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 340 
S.E.2d 600, 601 (Ga. 1986) (elaborating about how the incremental benefit to the 
adjacent land because of the use of nearby land for a MARTA station “cannot be 
deducted from the value of the land actually taken.”). 
78.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 324 (explaining that the special 
benefit “may not be deducted from value of the part taken”). 
79.  See id. (observing that courts base the “value plus damage” 
rule on constitutional or statutory requirement of just compensation). 
80.  See Westgate Ltd., v. Texas, 843 S.W.2d 448, 456 (Tex. 1992) 
(stating that “the landowner is in all cases entitled to at least the market value 
of the part taken”). 
81.  See Jerome P. Pesick, Eminent Domain: Calculating 
Compensation in Partial Taking Condemnation Cases, 82 MICH. BAR J. 12, 35 
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which will be outlined. Calculation of this method occurs through 
two steps, the first of which involves determining the difference 
between the fair market value of the property before and after 
the taking.82 This can be done through appraisals and real estate 
experts as a question for a finder of fact.83 Once the difference 
between the fair market value of the property before and after 
the taking is determined under the BAA model, the second step 
grants deductions for “benefits which may also accrue to the 
condemnee.”84 
Although at least one theorist has stated that BAA may 
simply be another way of expressing the VPD method without 
any actual difference, he later noted that the application seems to 
take a more realistic value of the damages, rather than the 
artificial nature of the VPD. 85  With the VPD method, “an 
appraiser is prone to exaggerate both elements of 
compensation . . . [T]he formula encourages him to make 
allowance for damages though none in fact may have been 
sustained.”86 Instead, the BAA method, by definition, efficiently 
incorporates any damages into the final valuation, leaving less 
room for human error.87 As a result, BAA ensures more accurate 
and fair results.  
                                                                                                                                      
(2003) (“Generally, just compensation is measured by determining the market 
value of the property that is taken.”). 
82.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 237 (“Under this so-called ‘before-
and-after’ rule, the measure of damages or compensation in such a case is the 
difference between the value of the whole tract, lot, or parcel of land 
immediately before the taking, and the value of the remaining part immediately 
afterward.”); see also ORGEL, supra note 50, § 51 (stating that one possible 
formula includes the “[d]ifference between the [f]air [m]arket [v]alue of the 
[p]roperty before and after the [t]aking). 
83. See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 237 (describing how the “before” 
and “after” valuations must also be calculated using the same method). 
84.  See id. § 335 (“[B]enefits accruing primarily to property not 
owned by the condemnee cannot be considered even though some incidental 
benefit may also accrue to the condemnee.”).  
85.  See ORGEL, supra note 50, § 51 (“Whether or not it is simply 
another mode of expressing “value of the land taken plus damages to the 
reminder” is a difficult question . . . it is at least more satisfactory than the more 
usual formula, for it recognizes the artificial nature of the dichotomy required 
by the latter.”). 
86.  Id. § 64. 
87.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 283 (“In the case of a partial 
taking, if the before and after measure of compensation is properly submitted to 
the jury, there is no occasion for counsel or the trial court to talk about 
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D. Defining Special and General Benefits 
 
Broadly, benefits incorporated into a just compensation 
award may be either “special” or “general.” 88  Although the 
difference between the two has been characterized as “nebulous 
at best,”89 special benefits tend to be specific to the remaining 
property, while general benefits are those “which affect the entire 
community or neighborhood.” 90 In fact, it has been stated that 
“[g]eneral benefits are those the adjoining landowner shares in 
common with the general public, and special benefits are those 
resulting from a public work that enhances the value of the lands 
not taken because of their advantageous relation to the 
improvement.”91  
One theorist has highlighted the differences by stating 
that “benefits which the public enjoys as a result of the 
improvement are classified as general benefits; benefits which 
inure to an individual landowner as a private advantage by 
reason of the direct relation of his remaining property to the 
improvement are classified as special benefits.” 92  Finally, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has noted 
that distinguishing between the two is not always an easy task, 
stating that, “as a general matter, special benefits are those that 
inure specifically to the landowner who suffered the partial 
taking and are associated with the ownership of the remaining 
land. In contrast, benefits that inure to the community at large 
are considered general.”93 
                                                                                                                                      
“severance damage” as such, and indeed it may be confusing to do so. The 
matter is taken care of automatically in the ‘before and after’ submission.”). 
88.  See id. § 345 (defining special and general benefits). 
89.  Id. § 342.   
90.  Sullivan v. N. Hudson Cnty. R.R. Co., 18 A. 689, 690 (N.J. 
1889). But see AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 345 (stating that a condemnee may 
receive a special benefit even if the entire neighborhood benefits from the 
taking). 
91.  AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 338. 
92.  Comment, Special Benefits and Just Compensation: Ensuring 
Fair Treatment of Landowners in Partial Taking Cases, 27 ME. L. REV. 279, 281 
n.9 (1975) (citing 3 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.6202 (3d ed. 1974)). 
93.  See Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (citations omitted). 
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Although these concepts may seem distinct in theory, they 
can become clouded in practice. 94  If a partial taking for the 
creation of a railroad will help the community but helps the 
landowner the most, it would be considered a general benefit 
even though it also gives special benefits to the landowner.95 
Conversely, even if a general benefit helps the community 
equally, the benefits to the individual landowner are not lost, 
despite the general community advantage.96 
Specifically, in forty-four states 97  and the federal 
government,98 “compensation for a partial taking will be reduced 
                                                          
94.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 343 (noting that because the 
distinction can be confusing, many courts have rejected it).  
95.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 348 (observing that a rationale for 
this classification is that it “allow[s] setoff against the compensation for those 
whose land has been partially taken, but [does] not . . . require any payment 
from others in the neighborhood who benefit from the improvement but whose 
property has not been taken.”).  
96.  See id. (noting that these are not special benefits and cannot 
be deducted). 
97. See generally Marion McRea v. Marion Cnty., 133 So. 278 (Ala. 
1931); Weber v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 990 P.2d 611, 612 (Alaska 1999); 
Taylor v. Arizona, 467 P.2d 251 (Ariz. 1970); Arkansas State Highway Comm’n 
v. Phillips, 398 S.W.2d 899 (Ark. 1966); E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. 455 Co., 3 
P.3d 18 (Colo. 2000); Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. Waterbury, 18 A.2d 700 
(Conn. 1941); Acierno v. Delaware, 643 A.2d 1328 (Del. 1994); Caspersen v. W. 
Coast Inland Nav. Dist., 198 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Williams v. 
State Highway Dep’t 85 S.E.2d 616  (Ga. 1971); Hawaii v. Midkiff, 516 P.2d 
1250 (Haw. 1973); State ex rel. Symms v. Collier, 454 P.2d 56 (Idaho1969); Dep’t 
of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Barton, 19 N.E.2d 395 (Ill. 1939); Gradison v. 
Indiana, 300 N.E.2d 67 (Ind. 1973); Horak Prairie Farm, L.P. v. Cedar Rapids, 
748 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 2008); Davis v. Leawood, 893 P.2d 233 (Kan. 1995); Dep’t 
of Highways v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963); Dep’t of Highways v. 
Trippeer Realty Corp., 276 So. 2d 315 (La. 1973); J.A. Rapaport Family Ltd. 
P’ship v. Brewer, 877 A.2d 1077 (Me. 2005); Washington Metro. Area Transit 
Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Montgomery Cnty, 691 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1982); 
Hilbourne v. Suffolk Cnty., 120 Mass. 393 (1876); Michigan Dep’t of Transp. v. 
Tomkins, 749 N.W.2d 716 (Mich. 2008); Minnesota v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554 
(Minn. 1992); Adcock v. Mississippi Transp. Comm’n, 981 So. 2d 942 (Miss. 
2008); State Highway Comm’n v. Gatson, 617 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); 
Lewis & Clark Cnty. v. Nett, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928); Prudential Ins. Co. v. 
Cent. Nebraska Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 296 N.W. 752 (Neb. 1941); Dep’t 
of Highways v. Haapanen, 448 P.2d 703 (Nev. 1968); Lebanon Hous. Auth. v. 
Nat’l Bank of Lebanon, 301 A.2d 37 (N.H. 1973); State Highway Dep’t v. Kistler-
Collister Co., 529 P.2d 611 (N.M. 1975); Lineburg v. Sandven, 21 N.W.2d 808 
(N.D. 1946); Hurst v. Starr, 607 N.E.2d 1155 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Williams 
Natural Gas Co. v. Perkins, 952 P.2d 483 (Okla. 1997); State Highway Comm’n 
v. Hooper, 488 P.2d 421 (Or. 1971); Appeal of Philadelphia Elec. Co. (PECO), 
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by the value of any special benefits to be conferred on the 
remaining land, but not by the value of any general benefits,” 
presumably so the condemnee isn’t forced to solely bear the cost 
of the surrounding neighborhood’s gain. 99  Such consideration 
precludes the offset of general benefits against the compensation 
award.100  
The Oregon Court of Appeals highlighted these special 
benefits in holding that “[a]ny devaluation of property retained 
by a condemnee can be offset by the value of any ‘special benefit’ 
that is conferred on the remaining property by the taking.”101 
Other courts have agreed, with one stating that “only ‘special’ 
benefits can be deducted from any compensation due; ‘general’ 
benefits cannot be deducted.”102 The Missouri Court of Appeals 
for the Southern District has been even more specific, noting, 
“special benefits to a condemnee’s remaining real estate may be 
set off against an award of compensation for the real estate that 
is taken, but general benefits may not be set off.”103 
In Bauman v. Ross, the Supreme Court held that for 
federal takings: 
  
                                                                                                                                      
580 A.2d 424 (Pa. 1990); Capital Props, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 636 A.2d 319 
(1994); Robinson v. Richland Cnty. Council, 358 S.E.2d 392 (S.C. 1987); State 
Highway Comm’n v. Emry, 244 N.W.2d 91 (S.D. 1976); Dep’t of Transp. v. 
Brevard, 545 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976); Texas v. McCarley, 247 S.W.3d 
323 (Tex. App. 2007); Utah v. Harvey Real Estate, 57 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2002); 
Howe v. State Highway Bd., 187 A.2d 342 (Vt. 1963); Washington v. Green, 578 
P.2d 855  (Wash. 1978); Hietpas v. Wisconsin, 130 N.W.2d 248 (Wis. 1964); 
State Highway Comm’n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1970). 
98.  See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 582 (1897) (noting that “the 
rule has been applied where the special benefits equaled or exceeded the 
damages, so that the owner of the land received nothing”).  
99.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 338; Jagow v. E-470 Pub. 
Highway Auth., 49 P.3d 1151, 1157 (Colo. 2002) (limiting the offset to special 
benefits, not general benefits); see also Moyer v. Nebraska City Airport Auth., 
655 N.W.2d 855, 863 (Neb. 2003) (limiting the offset to special benefits, not 
general benefits). 
100.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 352 (describing that benefits that 
are common to the entire “community may not be deducted from a 
condemnation award.”). 
101.  State of Oregon v. Fullerton, 34 P.3d 1180, 1181 (Or. Ct. App. 
2001). 
102.  Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
103.  See Brandon v. Estate of LaFavre, 9 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
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[I]f the proposed road or other improvement inure 
to the direct and special benefit of the individual 
out of whose property a part is taken, he receives 
something which none else of the public receive, 
and it is just that this should be taken into account 
in determining what is compensation.104  
 
In contrast, the Court would “exclude the indirect and 
general benefits which result to the public as a whole, and 
therefore to the individual as one of the public; for he pays in 
taxation for his share of such general benefits.”105 This decision 
was based upon the majority of states’ own holdings.106 
In contrast, six states—California,107 New Jersey,108 New 
York, 109  North Carolina, 110  Virginia 111  and West Virginia, 112 —
                                                          
104.  Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 581–82 (1897). 
105.  Id. at 581. 
106.  See id. at 583 (“[I]n the greater number of the states, unless 
expressly forbidden by constitution or statute, special benefits are allowed to be 
set off, both against the value of the part taken, and against damages to the 
reminder . . . .”). 
107.  See Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. 
Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 809 (Cal. 1997) (“A rule permitting offset of all reasonably 
certain, immediate and nonspeculative benefits has the virtue of treating 
benefits and severance damages evenhandedly.”). 
108.  See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 526–27 
(N.J. 2013) (“[W]hen a project calls for the construction of dunes along the entire 
public project requires the partial taking of property, ‘just compensation’ to the 
owner must be based on a consideration of all relevant, reasonably calculable, 
and non-conjectural factors that either decrease or increase the value of the 
remaining property.”). 
109.  See Chiesa v. New York, 324 N.E.2d 329, 333 (N.Y. 1974) (“The 
New York rule . . . may be formulated as follows: Value of land taken 
consequential damages to remainder minus general and special benefits = just 
compensation.”). 
110.  See Bd. of Transp. v. Jones, 255 S.E.2d 185, 187 (N.C. 1979) 
(“Where only a part of a tract is taken, the measure of damages for said taking 
shall be the difference between the fair market value of the entire tract 
immediately prior to said taking and the fair market value of the remainder 
immediately after said taking, with consideration being given to any special or 
general benefits resulting from the utilization of the part taken for highway 
purposes.”) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-112 (1959)).   
111.  See Long v. Shirley, 14 S.E.2d 375, 377–78 (Va. 1941) (stating 
that the intent of the Virginia legislature was to disregard the differences 
between special and general benefits). 
112.  See Guyandotte Valley Ry. v. Buskirk, 50 S.E. 521, 522 (W.Va. 
1905) (“Benefits, whether general and common to all property affected by the 
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reject the distinction between special and general benefits, and 
incorporate any reasonably calculable benefit that increases the 
fair market value of the remaining property, regardless of 
whether the benefit has a larger impact on the community as a 
whole.113  Notably, all six jurisdictions employ the BAA method of 
just compensation calculation.114 
The earliest of these cases, Guyandotte Valley Railway Co. 
v. Buskirk, was decided in 1905, however Los Angeles County 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Continental 
Development Corporation (California) and Borough of Harvey 
Cedars v. Karan (New Jersey) have both been decided in the past 
twenty years.115 Furthermore, Chiesa v. New York (New York) 
and Board of Transportation v. Jones (North Carolina) were 
decided in the 1970s, making the disregard for the distinction 
between general and special benefits a seemingly relatively 
recent movement.116 
Other than Harvey Cedars, which will be discussed in Part 
V, the primary case considering both special and general benefits 
is Continental Development Corporation. 117  In that case, the 
California Supreme Court overruled a century’s worth of 
precedent in a matter over the construction of an elevated light 
rail.118 The light rail reduced the landowner’s view, but it also 
                                                                                                                                      
work of improvement, or peculiar to it, when material, can obviously be 
considered for but one purpose, namely, deduction from the damages to the 
property.”). 
 113.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 325, (stating that under a strict 
interpretation of the before-and-after rule, any benefit is taken into 
consideration if it affects the value of the taking); see also id. § 343 (some courts 
find the distinction so confusing they’ve abolished it, and that other jurisdictions 
have abolished the distinction by statute). 
114.  See id. § 325 (noting that both special and general benefits are 
included into consideration).  
115.  See generally Guyandotte Valley Ry. v. Buskirk, 50 S.E. 521 
(W.Va. 1905); Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Trans. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 
P.2d 809 (Cal. 2002); Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 
2013).  
116.  See generally Chiesa v. New York, 324 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1974); 
Bd. of Transp. v. Jones, 255 S.E.2d 185 (N.C. 1979). But see Long v. Shirley, 14 
S.E.2d 375 (Va. 1941). 
117.  941 P.2d 809 (Cal. 2002). 
118.  See Continental Dev. Corp., 941 P. 2d at 811–12 (“Here, the 
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (the MTA) brought 
a condemnation action to acquire a narrow strip of land for an easement along 
one side of a parcel owned by Continental Development Corporation 
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provided the benefit of access to quicker and easier 
transportation.119 As a result, the Court found that since the goal 
of the Takings Clause is to make condemnees whole, and nothing 
more, true and complete indemnity requires the offset of all 
benefits actually received . . . including general benefits.120 
In addition, some states have rejected the distinction 
between special and general benefits only in certain 
circumstances and for specific types of takings.121 In at least one 
jurisdiction, the special benefits alone may count as just 
compensation, without any financial remuneration necessary.122 
While VPD typically doesn’t allow benefits to detract from the 
valuation of the taken property, merely the severance damages to 
the remainder, it’s possible under the BAA context that 
effectively no compensation will be required if the benefits to the 
remaining property are large enough as to completely overwhelm 
the loss of the property.123 For example, if the construction of a 
dune is the only thing that can prevent a beach house from 
                                                                                                                                      
(Continental) for the construction of a portion of an elevated light rail line 
known as the Green Line.”). 
119.  See id. at 812 (relaying that the trial court did not allow the 
evidence because the court reasoned “that proximity to the transit 
station was not a special benefit because it was shared by 
numerous properties in the vicinity”). 
120.  See id. at 824 (“A rule permitting offset of all reasonably 
certain, immediate and nonspeculative benefits has the virtue of treating 
benefits and severance damages evenhandedly.”). 
121.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 343 (rejecting the distinction 
because of the confusion caused); see also Crum v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 4 
P.2d 564, 573 (Cal. 1931) (“In eminent domain cases, other than those which 
involve rights of way, both general and special benefits which accrue to either 
the portion taken or that which remains, may be considered and set off against 
the damages assessed.”). 
 122.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 338 (“Special benefits conferred 
on a property owner’s remaining property as a direct result of a taking may 
constitute just compensation”); see also Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control 
Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 864 (Cal. 1997) (“More explicitly, the court has long held that 
the special benefits conferred on a property owner's remaining property as a 
direct result of a taking may constitute just compensation.”). 
123.  See MaryAnn Spoto, Harvey Cedars Couple Receives $1 
Settlement for Dune Blocking Ocean View, THE STAR-LEDGER (Sep. 25, 2013, 1:21 
PM), 
http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2013/09/harvey_cedars_sand_dune_dispute_s
ettled.html (stating that the initial settlement offer was for $300, but the case 
eventually settled for $1) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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guaranteed destruction, that special benefit, if calculable in 
financial terms, may completely offset the extent to which the 
government must provide just compensation.124 
Others have looked to an “increase in the market value of 
the remaining property [as] the sole test by which a court 
ascertains the deductibility of a benefit,” where “the distinction 
between general and special benefits becomes meaningless, since 
a finding of market value necessarily includes value contributed 
by any kind of benefit, general as well as special.”125 Therefore, 
general benefits are included because they recognize the gain 
realized by the landowner that he would undoubtedly receive, 
regardless of the gain others will also obtain.126 
All jurisdictions agree that any benefit, either special or 
general, must be real and cannot be speculative, which is true of 
damages in both the VPD and BAA context.127 Like damages, 
future benefits can only be used if they are certain, or reasonably 
certain to be realized. 128  These benefits must additionally be 
calculable and measurable in financial terms so they may be 
deducted from the compensation award.129 
For example, if the benefit of a storm protective dune and 
extended beach would save the remaining property from almost 
certain destruction, the benefit can be reasonably calculated.130 
As a corollary, if a highway might help a farm but it is unclear 
                                                          
124.  See id. (detailing how dunes the dunes were created after 
Hurricane Sandy for protection by the Army Corp of Engineers).   
125.  AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 339; Illinois State Toll Highway Auth. 
v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 624 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Ill. 1994) 
(stating that any benefits that are not speculative or conjectural may be 
considered). 
126.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 353 (“[B]enefits resulting from an 
improvement generally are not deductible from the damage award where the 
condemnee's remaining land has been or will be assessed for the cost of the 
improvements.”).  
127.  See id. § 281 (“[R]ecovery may not be based on speculative, 
remote, imaginary, or merely possible events.”).  
128.  See id. § 331 (noting that future benefits can only be used if a 
finder of fact is certain they will be realized). 
129.  See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 526–27 
(N.J. 2013) (“We now conclude that when a public project requires the partial 
taking of property, ‘just compensation’ to the owner must be based on a 
consideration of all relevant, reasonably calculable, and non-conjectural factors 
that either decrease or increase the value of the remaining property.”). 
130.  See id. at 529 (demonstrating how storm protection benefits 
may be calculable). 
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how much or the benefits cannot be quantified in economic terms, 
those benefits may not be included in the final compensation 
award. While VPD protects the condemnee by adding damages, 
BAA makes takings easier, or at least less costly, for the 
government, as there can be a greater deduction for benefits from 
the valuation.131  
 
IV. Impact on Environmental Takings 
 
Since 2005, Hurricane Katrina destroyed New Orleans,132 
An Inconvenient Truth exposed the practical impact of global 
warming, 133  the explosion at Deepwater Horizon released 4.9 
million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico,134 and Hurricane 
Sandy caused severe damage to the northeastern coast of the 
United States.135 
The legal ramifications of these crises are endless, 
involving questions of tort liability, criminal negligence, and 
property claims, among others.136  Environmental and property 
law have become increasingly intertwined as a result of 
increasing land use and zoning regulations, which can dictate 
liability and responsibility for preventative and post-
environmental crisis cleanup measures. 137  Property law may 
                                                          
131.  See ORGEL, supra note 50, §§ 50–51 (listing the requirements 
and benefits of each method). 
132. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 443 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (noting the extent of damage caused by Hurricane Katrina). 
133. AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH  (Lawrence Bender Prods. 2006). 
134.  JANE LUBCHENCO ET AL., BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL BUDGET: 
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OIL? 1 (U.S. Geological Survey 2010), available at 
http://www.usgs.gov/foia/budget/08-03-
2010...Oil%20Budget%20description%20FINAL.pdf (stating that 4.9 million 
barrels of oil were released) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
135.  Superstorm Sandy Slams Northeast, Triggers Massive 
Blackouts and Flooding, CBS NEWS & ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 30, 2012, 2:00 
AM) www.cbsnews.com/news/superstorm-sandy-slams-northeast-triggers-
massive-blackouts-and-flooding/ (describing the extent of the damage in the 
northeast) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
136.  See In re Katrina Canal, 696 F.3d at 443 (listing plaintiff’s 
claims against the federal government for damages caused by Hurricane 
Katrina). 
137.  See John Schwartz, Accord Reached Settling Lawsuit Over BP 
Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2012), 
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dictate if beachfront property owners are responsible for building 
levees to prevent Hurricane Katrina destruction, or if such 
actions are within the purview of the government.138 Likewise, 
property law has helped determine responsibility for the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill cleanup.139 
While environmental jurisprudence has developed 
significantly over the past forty years,140 the law of takings has 
remained relatively unchanged, with the notable exception of 
Kelo v. City of New London.141 Since the founding of the United 
States, there have been few notable changes in our 
understanding of eminent domain, just one of which was related 
to partial takings.142 This has left the field underdeveloped in 
certain aspects.143 
Eminent domain’s staggered development is not 
necessarily flawed, but its slow evolution creates a problem when 
planning for the future.144 The jurisprudence of eminent domain 
highlights how legal regimes that seek to remedy past wrongs in 
a static world are insufficient when faced with prospective issues 
that can have severe consequences in the future. If the 
government is expected to take action to prevent coastal 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/us/accord-reached-settling-lawsuit-over-bp-
oil-spill.html?_r=0 (stating that British Petroleum would be responsible for 
paying for the cleanup in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
138.  See 50 AM. JUR. 2D. Levees and Flood Control § 3 (2014)  
(discussing federal powers and responsibilities in relation to flood prevention 
measures). 
139.  See Schwartz, supra note 137 (summarizing the settlement 
reached by British Petroleum, who owned the Deepwater Horizon well). 
140. See References/Links: Environmental Laws & Treatises, 
NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/reference/laws.asp 
(indicating that a majority of federal environmental statutes have been enacted 
since 1972) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
141.  See SINGER, supra note 23, at 678–92 (providing a historical 
background of takings law indicating that takings jurisprudence has not 
changed much since Penn Central). 
142.  See id. (discussing how takings jurisprudence is historically 
static). 
143.  See supra Part II (summarizing the history of eminent 
domain). 
144. See SINGER, supra note 23 (outlining three issues as  a result of 
takings jurisprudence: (1) the Supreme Court has developed different tests over 
time; (2) precedent; and (3) issues of fairness and justice). 
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destruction caused by the projected increase in tropical storms,145 
it should not be forced to rely on property law developed decades 
before such a crisis could have been predicted. If even one 
property is left unprotected because of disagreements over just 
compensation, the entire area is at risk of destruction by a coastal 
storm.146 
The current partial takings jurisprudence consequently 
gives to the individual undue priority over society, limiting the 
government’s ability to respond to future environmental 
challenges. This misalignment of priorities has and will continue 
to give rise to scenarios in which the government cannot take 
necessary protective measures due to overwhelming costs.147 As a 
result, it is necessary to ease the burden on the government in 
the case of partial takings for the good of society as a whole.  
The current methods of calculating just compensation in 
partial takings cases are outdated in most jurisdictions and do 
not allow for the increased need for government to confront 
environmental issues head-on.148 These issues are, in many cases, 
not predictable, and will strain the status quo to a breaking 
point. 149  The modification proposed will lessen the burden on 
jurisdictions trying to get a step ahead of the curve, whereas 
current statutory regimes such as VPD have the effect of 
protecting the individual when it is the general public that needs 
greater protection in the face of impending environmental 
                                                          
145.  See Future Climate Change, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/future.html 
(last visited March 15, 2015) (stating that climate change will cause an increase 
in tropical storms) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
146.  See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 526 (N.J. 
2013) (explaining the importance of a dune in front of the Karan’s beachfront 
property). 
147. See Anthony F. DellaPelle & Richard P. DeAngelis, Jr., 
Commentary, New Jersey’s New View on Parital Takings Compensation, 65 
PLAN. & ENVTL. L. J. 4 (Nov. 2013) (raising the issue as to whom should pay for 
partial takings). 
148. See supra Part II. B (defining the value plus damage method to 
calculate just compensation and its shortcomings). 
149. See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 324 (commenting that under VPD 
the landowner will get just compensation for the entire value of the property 
taken regardless of any benefit to the landowner as a result of the taking). 
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challenges. 150  As a result, a widespread adoption of the BAA 
method for calculating just compensation in partial takings cases 
is the best solution, provided the award can be offset for both 
reasonably calculable and definite special and general benefits. 
 
V. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan 
 
In 2013, the Supreme Court of New Jersey significantly 
altered its partial takings jurisprudence with its decision in 
Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan. 151  The environmental 
concerns it addressed highlight the challenges faced by courts 
attempting to balance the rights of property owners with the need 
for state action, notably in an environmental context.  
In 2008, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began 
collaborating with the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection and local municipalities on a beach-restoration and 
storm-protection project on Long Beach Island, New Jersey.152 
The plan consisted of extending the shoreline by 200 feet into the 
ocean to prevent beach erosion, maintaining the amount of sand 
every five to seven years, and building trapezoidal dunes twenty-
two feet high and thirty feet wide at the top, to protect the island 
from future storms capable of destroying homes and businesses in 
the region.153  
As part of the project, the Borough of Harvey Cedars 
sought to secure eighty-two perpetual easements along the shore, 
upon which the dunes would be built.154 Sixty-six property owners 
granted their voluntary consent, 155  and when the remaining 
sixteen property owners balked, the Borough adopted an 
                                                          
158.  See Superstorm Sandy Slams Northeast, supra note 135 
(explaining the last minute changes in forecasting for the scope of the storm). 
151. See New Jersey’s New View, supra note 147 (“This decision 
represented a departure by the court form a long-standing doctrine known as 
the ‘special benefits’ doctrine, which had controlled the valuation of properties 
in partial takings cases for decades.”). 
152. See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 527–28 
(N.J. 2013) (providing background to the dune restoration project at issue). 
153. See id. at 527 (describing the planned beach restoration and 
dune construction). 
154. See id. (“The Borough’s obligation was to secure eighty-two 
perpetual easements over the portions of private beachfront properties closest to 
the ocean on which the dunes would be built.”). 
155. See id. at 527–28 (“The Borough acquired sixty-six easements 
by voluntary consent of the property owners.”). 
NECESSARY CHANGE 577 
ordinance taking from each the sliver of property under its 
statutory eminent domain authority.156 Harvey and Phyllis Karan 
were the owners of one of the holdout properties, and contested 
the nominal amount of $300 offered by the government in 
recompense for the land taken and the devaluation of the 
remaining property.157 
At the trial and appellate levels, the New Jersey courts 
found that “merely because ‘differing property owners enjoy the 
benefit to different degrees does not convert a general benefit into 
a special benefit,’”158 and subsequently disregarded the general 
benefits provided to the Karans.159 Furthermore, the trial court 
instructed the jury to only consider damages, which consisted 
mostly of a reportedly decreased view of the ocean, and special 
benefits, plus the value of the taken land in the award.160 The 
jury was not allowed to consider general benefits, of which the 
storm protection was the key feature.161  
Without the project, Randall A. Wise of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers determined there was only a 27% chance of 
the Karan’s’ property surviving fifty years without storm 
damage.162 Furthermore, over a thirty-year period, there was a 
56% likelihood of a storm “totally” damaging their property 
without the creation of the dunes.163 With the project completed, 
the Karan’s property would likely survive the next 200 years’ 
worth of storms.164 Wise, a civil engineer specializing in coastal 
                                                          
156. See id. at 528 (“However, the owners of sixteen beachfront 
properties, including the Karans, did not consent. As a result, in July 2008, the 
Borough adopted an ordinance authorizing it to acquire easements over those 
sixteen properties through its statutory powers of eminent domain.”). 
157. See id. (“The Karans rejected the Borough’s offer of $300 as 
compensation for both the land taken and any devaluation of the remaining 
property.”). 
158. Id. at 529. 
159. See id. at 529–30 (noting the trial and appellete courts 
disregard of the general benefits given to the Karans).  
160. See id. at 531 (“However, the court advised the jury to 
disregard, in valuing the Karans’ remainder property, any general benefit 
flowing from the public project.”). 
161. See id. (citing jury instructions state that the jury not consider 
general benefits). 
162. See id. at 529 (presenting statistics related to the value added 
from the dune construction). 
163. See id. (discussing the probability of future damage). 
164. See id. (noting the benefits of the project). 
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engineering, calculated this information using statistical analysis 
that determined decreasing levels of risk for each “line” of homes 
stretching away from the ocean.165 
Wise’s analysis became reality, much more quickly than 
he could have ever predicted. Hurricane Sandy devastated Long 
Beach Island in 2012, inflicting an estimated $700,000,000 in 
damage. 166  Notably, the places where the Army Corps of 
Engineers’ dunes had been created were spared from the 
destruction.167 “There are the places that had a protective dune 
system installed and, as a result, sustained minimal damage. 
Then there are the areas where there were no tall dunes, where 
Sandy made its destructive powers known.”168 Hurricane Sandy, 
in effect, justified Wise’s proposal and solidified the preventative 
measures as a valuable public purpose.  
The project budget was roughly $25,000,000, with the 
Borough responsible for just $1,000,000 of the total amount.169 
The jury calculated compensation using the previous New Jersey 
method of calculation, which was the BAA method but did not 
allow for consideration of general benefits.170 Using this model, 
                                                          
165. See id. (listing Randall A. Wise’s qualifications and role as an 
expert). 
166. See Ryan Hutchins, Long Beach Island Officials Shocked at 
Extent of Damage from Hurricane Sandy, THE STAR-LEDGER (Oct. 31, 2012, 8:43 
PM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/10/lbi_hurricane_sandy_damage.html 
(“It will take at least $700 million to remake this 18-mile strip of land, an 
estimate that could certainly surpass $1 billion as more is learned.”) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
167. See Ryan Hutchins & Seth Augenstein, N.J. Sand Dunes 
Protected Shore Towns from Hurricane Sandy’s Wrath, THE STAR-LEDGER (Nov. 
6, 2012, 7:05 AM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/11/nj_sand_dunes_protected_shore.html 
(describing the difference in damage from Hurricane Sandy when comparing 
areas that had dune construction and those that had not) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
168. Id. 
169. See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 530 (“The cost of the project was 
approximately twenty-five million dollars, with the Borough bearing 
approximately one million dollars of the cost, the State approximately seven-
and-one-half million dollars, and the federal government the balance.”). 
170. See id. at 531 (“The trial court charged the jury that the 
Karans were entitled to ‘just compensation’ for the easement acquired by the 
Borough ‘measured by the difference between the fair market value of the entire 
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and unable to consider the storm protection benefits the Karan’s 
would receive because they were deemed general and would help 
the island as a whole, the jury level calculated the just 
compensation of the taken property, plus damages to the 
remainder, at $375,000.171 The damages mostly consisted of the 
loss of some view due to the large dunes.172 
If the $375,000 amount were to be prorated to the 
remaining fifteen properties, the Borough would have had to pay 
$6,000,000, or six times its portion of the budget of the project, 
simply to acquire the easements.173 This does not even take into 
consideration the other sixty-six property owners who would 
likely demand similar compensation and not acquiesce towards a 
much smaller figure, as they did.174 Furthermore, that $6,000,000 
figure does not include the actual construction costs, which would 
drive the number significantly higher. 175  As such, full 
compensation would have made the costs of the project incredibly 
high, and if the lower court’s decision had stood, likely impossible 
to carry out. Following the decisions in favor of the Karans by the 
trial and appellate levels, the Borough appealed to the New 
Jersey Supreme Court.176 
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that just 
compensation in partial-takings “must be based on a 
consideration of all relevant, reasonably calculable, and non-
conjectural factors that either decrease or increase the value of 
the remaining property.” 177  As such, the Court removed the 
distinction between general and special benefits, finding them to 
be outdated, contradictory, and impossible to distinguish. 178  
                                                                                                                                      
property . . . immediately before the taking and the fair market 
value . . . immediately after the taking.”). 
171.  See id. (“The jury returned an award of $375,000 as 
compensation for the easement and for any damages to the remainder of the 
Karans’ property.”). 
 172.  See id. at 528 (discussing the damages from the taking). 
173. See id. (discussing the scope of the Borough’s project). 
174. See id. at 527–28 (noting that some of the other property 
owners gave the easements without “just compensation”). 
175. See id. at 528 (noting the initial compensation offered only 
considered compensation for the value of the land taken and any loss of value to 
the remaining property). 
 176. See id. at 532 (discussing the procedural history of the case). 
177.  Id. at 526–27. 
178.  See id. at 539–40  (“As to this distinction, it has been said that 
more rules, different from and inconsistent with each other, have been laid 
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Instead, the Court simply looked at the fair market value of the 
property before and after the taking by considering all non-
speculative factors that any real buyer would consider,179 with 
the end goal that compensation “in a partial-takings case must be 
‘just’ to both the landowner and the public.”180 
The Court held that a formula that “does not permit 
consideration of the quantifiable benefits of a public project that 
increase the value of the remaining property” due to general 
benefits that increase value to the neighborhood as a whole is not 
just and does not reflect the owner’s true loss.181 The practical 
effect of this change allows the finder of fact to consider general 
benefits in the calculation process because they aided the public 
and not just the landowner.182 
As its rationale, the New Jersey Supreme Court focused 
on the different degrees of benefit shared by the landowners that 
make the storm protection a special benefit, rather than a 
general benefit.183 The Court also heavily focused on the difficulty 
courts have had in distinguishing between general and special 
benefits, with contradictory results that have led to confusion.184 
By erasing the distinction between the two, the Court chose to 
simplify the determination to any factor that would be considered 
in a typical arms-length negotiation.185 
                                                                                                                                      
down on this point than upon any other point in the law of eminent domain.”) 
(citing Daniels v. State Rd. Dep’t, 170 So.2d 846, 854 (Fla. 1964)). 
179.  See id. at 540 (“Benefits that both a willing buyer and willing 
seller would agree enhance the value of property should be considered in 
determining just compensation, whether those benefits are categorized as 
special or general.”).  
180.  See id. at 527 (discussing the intent behind compensation and 
the ultimate goal that the award be just). 
181.  See id. (explaining the shortcomings of the calculations used by 
the courts below). 
182. See id. at 537 (noting the general definition of general benefits)  
183.  See id. at 541 (“Unquestionably, the benefits of the dune 
project extended not only to the Karans but also to their neighbors further from 
the shoreline. . . . Therefore, the Karans benefitted to a greater degree than 
their westward neighbors.”). 
184.  See id. at 539 (“The task of distinguishing between special and 
general benefits—as defined by case law in New Jersey and other jurisdictions—
is difficult ‘even for trained legal minds.’”). 
185.  See id. at 543 (“The Borough should not have been barred from 
presenting all non-speculative, reasonably calculable benefits from the dune 
project—the kind that a willing purchaser and willing seller would consider in 
an arm’s length transaction.”). 
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To calculate the final valuation amount, finders of fact 
may hear testimony from real estate appraisal experts as to the 
value of these general benefits upon the specific property 
owner.186 If the property is likely to be damaged or destroyed 
without the completed government project, the resulting 
compensation will be lowered accordingly to reflect the project’s 
necessity.187 
To that end, a court may choose to award nominal 
damages if the reasonably calculable benefits vastly outweigh the 
severance damages. 188  In fact, Harvey and Phyllis Karan 
eventually settled for $1 in nominal damages following Hurricane 
Sandy and the destruction of much of Long Beach Island, despite 
the initial offer of $300 by the Borough.189 
The decision in Harvey Cedars presents a dramatic shift in 
eminent domain law by allowing use of eminent domain in 
natural disaster prevention projects that would otherwise be 
prohibitively expensive. 190  Without the decision, the Borough 
would likely have been unable to complete the project, at least 
within the apportioned budget, placing all of Long Beach Island 




                                                          
186.  See id. at 544 (“At that trial, the Borough will have the 
opportunity to present evidence of any non-speculative, reasonably calculable 
benefits that inured to the advantage of the Karans’ property at the time of the 
taking.”). 
187.  See id. (“In short, the quantifiable decrease in the value of 
their property—loss of view—should have been set off by any quantifiable 
increase in its value—storm-protection benefits.”). 
188.  See id. at 530 (“Dr. Molliver determined that the Borough’s 
taking of 3,381 square feet of the Karan’s property had a de minimis value of 
only $300.”). 
189.  See Harvey Cedars Couple Receives $1, supra note 123 (stating 
the initial and final settlement offers). 
190. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public 
Acquisition of Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
295, 295–97 (2003) (describing the increase in government “givings” actions that 
increase the value of coastal private property). 
191. See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 527 (noting that “[t]he dune-
construction project required the securing of easements on properties bordering 
the ocean”).  
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VI. Proposed Change and Its Effects 
 
 This Note proposes that other jurisdictions adopt the 
aforementioned holding in Harvey Cedars and should modify 
their just compensation calculation formulas to include both 
general and specific benefits as part of the BAA analysis.192 As 
the Harvey Cedars Court noted, the two categories of benefits are 
often interpreted in a contradictory manner, and even the most 
trained of legal minds struggle to identify the difference in 
practice.193 
In Harvey Cedars, the rest of the neighborhood shared, in 
varying degrees, the general benefit of protection against the 
destruction from a future storm.194 Although the benefits received 
from this protection are practical, such as the continued security 
of a home, and not exclusively financial, such as an increase in 
business due to a new highway, the price and financial value of 
that home is still calculable. 195  As the storm protection was 
classified as a general benefit shared by the neighborhood, the 
benefits afforded by the dunes could not be calculated under the 
old formula of disallowing general benefits to be considered.196 
However, the old New Jersey formula ignores the fact that Karan 
received a disproportionate special benefit within the general 
benefit, and does not grant the government leeway if their project 
                                                          
192.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, §§ 290, 343 (stating that some 
jurisdictions effectively disregard the distinction between general and special 
benefits in deducting from the total just compensation, either statutorily or 
effectively). 
193.  See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 539 (“The task of distinguishing 
between special and general benefits—as defined by case law in New Jersey and 
other jurisdictions—is difficult ‘even for trained legal minds.’”). 
194.  See id. at 529 (“[C]ertain storms would cause damage to 
frontline properties but not to properties further from the ocean. Risk of storm 
damage drops significantly the further a property is from the ocean . . . .”). 
195. See id. at 543–44 (“The jury in this case should have been 
charged that the determination of just compensation required calculating the 
fair market value of the Karans' property immediately before the taking and 
after the taking (and construction of the twenty-two-foot dune).”). 
196.  See id. at 544 (“The trial court’s charge required the jury to 
disregard even quantifiable storm-protection benefits resulting from the public 
project that increased the fair market value of the Karans’ property.”). 
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will save an entire neighborhood from certain environmental 
destruction.197 
 Instead, the new formulas include all benefits and 
damages that are reasonable calculable, and which may increase 
or decrease the value of the remaining property.198 In so doing, 
courts will likely award compensation that closely resembles an 
arms-length exchange where the condemnee sells the taken piece 
of property at the true fair market price. 199  As a result, the 
compensation award will be significantly fairer to the 
government and will result in fewer windfalls for the 
condemnee.200 
 In Harvey Cedars, the Court discussed the historical 
development of general and special benefits, and noted that the 
distinction, at least in New Jersey, came from railroads in the 
1800s that took property to build tracks and gave only nominal 
damages as compensation.201 The railroads argued that increased 
population and commerce were enough to essentially eliminate 
any compensation.202 The effect of this new formula, however, 
would preclude such an unfair result to the landowner, as the 
benefits considered must be reasonably calculable and cannot 
have the same indefinite timeline or assistance that the railroads 
                                                          
197. See id. at 527 (“A formula . . . that does not permit 
consideration of the quantifiable benefits of a public project that increase the 
value of the remaining property in a partial-takings case will lead to a 
compensation award that does not reflect the owner’s true loss.”).  
198.  See id. at 526–27 (“We now conclude that when a public project 
requires the partial taking of property, ‘just compensation’ to the owner must be 
based on a consideration of all relevant, reasonably calculable, and non-
conjectural factors that either decrease or increase the value of the remaining 
property.”). 
199.  See id. at 543 (“The Borough should not have been barred from 
presenting all non-speculative, reasonably calculable benefits from the dune 
project—the kind that a willing purchaser and willing seller would consider in 
an arm’s length transaction.”). 
200.  See id. at 527 (“In a partial-takings case, homeowners are 
entitled to the fair market value of their loss, not to a windfall, not to a payout 
that disregards the home’s enhanced value resulting from a public project.”). 
201. See id. at 536–37 (noting that railroads justified low 
compensation amounts on the benefits transportation development conferred on 
communities). 
202.  See id. at 536 (“[R]ailroads argued that the benefits from 
increased population and commerce . . . made the remainder property more 
valuable.”). 
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preferred.203 Simply put, “[t]he historical reasons that gave rise to 
the development of the doctrine of general and special benefits no 
longer have resonance today.” 204  With the allowance of any 
quantifiable yet definite benefit to be considered, the problem of 
unfair results to the landowner may be limited, if not 
eliminated.205 
 Certainly in cases like Harvey Cedars, when the property 
will almost undoubtedly be destroyed without action, 206  full 
consideration should be left to the finder of fact since the 
remainder may be worthless without the government’s taking, 
regardless of general or specific benefit determination.207 Ideally, 
the proposed modification, through simple fairness, would 
encourage the government to partially take property for 
environmentally friendly purposes, such as beach replenishment, 
storm protection, alternative energy creation, among other goals, 
as there will be a financial incentive for projects due to a lower 
economic cost.208 
 
VII. Arguments and Alternatives 
 
Like many other debates, the proposed change here has its 
advocates and detractors; the government on one side, and 
landowners on the other. 209  Despite concerns over individual 
                                                          
203.  See id. at 542 (explaining why the railroad formula is not 
workable today). 
204.  Id. 
205. See id. at 544 (concluding that decreases in property values 
should be offset by value increases resulting from storm-protection benefits 
because those affected by government takings “are entitled to just 
compensation, a reasonable calculation of any decrease in the fair market value 
of their property after the taking”). 
206. See id. at 529 (“Without the dune project, the Karans’ project 
had only a 27% chance of surviving fifty years without any storm damage.”). 
207. See id. at 533 (“’[T]he gate keeping function of the trial court is 
to determine if evidence is reliable and not speculative, and once determined to 
be reliable, it is for the jury to determine what, if any, impact the evidence 
presented has on just compensation.’”) (citing State v. Caoili, 693 A.2d 275 (N.J. 
1994)). 
208. See Barnhizer, supra note 190, at 297 (stating that the 
“government must increase its emphasis on property acquisition as a response 
to repetitive flood losses and heightened flood risks on coastal floodplains”).   
209. See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 526–27214 N.J. at 388–89 
(describing the tension between a compensation method that incorporates 
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rights, landowners have been increasingly in favor of such a 
change following the destruction caused by Hurricane Sandy,210 
when the need for partial takings to build storm protection at 
cost-effective prices became more important than maximizing 
financial compensation for the landowner.211  As a result, it is 
important that just compensation be fair to both the government 
and the landowner.212 
 Supporters of the Harvey Cedars decision might argue 
that the rule change acts as an incentive for the government to 
take property for the environmental benefit of the public.213 When 
building storm protection, alternative forms of energy creation, or 
even a proliferation of oil pipelines to cheapen prices, among 
other possible scenarios, the landowners are the ultimate 
beneficiaries.214 The inclusion of general benefits, as recognized 
                                                                                                                                      
speculative future benefits and one that is limited to immediately ascertainable 
benefits). 
210.  See Erin O’Neill, Harvey Cedars Neighbors Say Dune 
Protection Outweighs Obstruction of Ocean Views, THE STAR-LEDGER (July 9, 
2013, 6:29 AM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2013/07/karan_harvey_cedars_dunes. html 
(“Lalevee—a 78-year-old Bergen County resident—said his views of the crashing 
waves along the shoreline were obstructed by the dune project, but ‘I rather 
have that than have a lot of other problems.’”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
211. See MaryAnn Spoto, Toms River to Start Eminent Domain 
Proceedings Against 16 Oceanfront Property Owners, THE STAR-LEDGER (OCT. 22, 
2013, 8:31 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2013/10/toms_river_votes_to_start_ 
eminent_domain_proceedings_against_16_oceanfront_property_owners.html 
(“‘If this dune system was in place during Hurricane Sandy, the devastation 
that impacted our community would not have occurred,’ Wittmann said. ‘It 
would not have occurred because the dune would have protected the township.’”) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
212.  See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 527 (“In a partial-takings case, 
homeowners are entitled to the fair market value of their loss, not to a windfall, 
not to a payout that disregards the home’s enhanced value resulting from a 
public project.”). 
213. See Barnhizer, supra note 190, at 295–99 (discussing 
government takings actions designed to protect coastal property and the 
incentives provided to landowners by “landowners who receive compensation for 
the value of past governmental givings in addition to whatever value the 
landowner may have created in the property through individual actions related 
to real market risks”). 
214. See id. at 300 (“At the center of the controversy is the 
inevitable tension between the rights and duties . . . This tension has long been 
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by the Harvey Cedars decision, would therefore recognize their 
beneficiary status as an alternative means of compensation. 
Furthermore, without such environmentally or energy focused 
takings, society suffers as a result. 215  When the government 
cannot afford to build storm protection to shelter a number of 
houses along the coastline from being destroyed, it does not 
matter how much a landowner believes their view is worth.216 
As federal, state, and local governments increasingly seek 
to perform takings for environmental or energy purposes, the 
idea of being unable to afford projects is a real possibility.217 The 
inability to effectuate takings within reasonable financial limits 
has forced the State of Texas to cancel a $40 million beach 
restoration project similar to the one in Harvey Cedars and 
necessary to prevent high erosion rates from destroying 
infrastructure,218 in the wake of ongoing litigation in Severance v. 
Patterson.219 
                                                                                                                                      
recognized in Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence as the extent to which 
private individuals should bear burdens intended to benefit the community at 
large.”). 
215. See Barnhizer, supra note 190, at 310 (“[W]e may reach a 
point—if indeed we have not already passed it—where it will be too expensive to 
pull back, even if the cost of not doing so includes enormous economic and 
human losses and catastrophic environmental damage.”). 
216. See id. at 313 (“Over time, beaches, dunes, and barrier islands 
alter their size, shape, location, and topography in reaction to erosive and 
accretive forces of wave action, storm surge, and rising sea levels. Each of these 
changes alters the ability of the coastal floodplain to protect inland areas from 
flooding.”).  
217. See Heather Smith, Crude Awakening: As Keystone Opens in 
Texas, Neighbors Fight to Protect their Water, GRIST (Jan. 23, 2014), 
http://grist.org/climate-energy/oil-and-water-as-texas-keystone-pipe-opens-
neighbors-organize-to-protect-their-aquifer/ (stating that increased litigation 
delay and may end proposed eminent domain projects) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
218.  See Press Release, Jerry Patterson, Land Comm’r, Texas Gen. 
Land Office, West Galveston Island Beach Project Is Cancelled: Timing and 
Legal Issues from Court Decision Spells End for Project (Nov. 15, 2010), 
available at http://www.glo.texas.gov/glo_news/press_releases/2010/ 
NOVEMBER/West-Galveston-Island.pdf (“Patterson said a recent Texas 
Supreme Court opinion in a case brought forward by California-based Pacific 
Legal Foundation has muddied the legal waters enough to delay the beach 
project indefinitely.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
219.  370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012). 
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 Furthermore, cases in California in recent years have 
indicated, “acquiring property through eminent domain is an 
increasingly costly prospect for the government.”220 As another 
example, California is seeking to build a high-speed rail system, 
which could have “devastating, irreversible effects on the state’s 
environment,” and which will require at least separate partial 
takings, which could be prohibitively expensive.221 The financial 
feasibility of these projects, especially in the environmental 
context, remains an important factor to consider.  
 There remains a logical fallacy to say that the individual 
bears the burden for society when their compensation is reduced 
due to general benefits.222 If the dunes had not been built, Karan 
would have suffered to a greater degree than most, as evidenced 
by Hurricane Sandy.223 In many cases, simply because a general 
benefit assists the public does not mean the value does not exist 
to the particular property owner, who may benefit 
disproportionately.224 If the taking of property for a windmill will 
lower energy costs or a local park will benefit the neighborhood 
by raising property values, the degree to which the condemnee 
                                                          
220.  Paul Shigley, Eminent Domain Acquisitions Grow More 
Expensive, CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT (Jan. 30, 2008, 4:26 
PM), http://www.cp-dr.com/node/1915 (“Courts have issued four recent court 
decisions regarding eminent domain that suggest that acquiring property 
through eminent domain is an increasingly costly prospect for the government.”) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
221.  Joe Guzzardi, Judge Sends High-Speed Rail Plan Off the 
Tracks, LODI-NEWS SENTINEL (Jan. 4, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.lodinews.com/opinion/ columnists/joe_guzzardi/article_b2365b98-
2c0e-593b-8c93-7109fb544d94.html (“[T]he rail would have devastating, 
irreversible effects on the state’s environment, encourage further unsustainable 
population growth and, despite its huge cost, have no guarantee of ridership.”) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
222. See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 526 (N.J. 
2013) (explaining the requirement of providing “just compensation” to 
individuals whose property has been taken through eminent domain 
proceedings).   
223.  See id. at 527 (observing the protective nature of the dunes 
constructed to prevent property destruction).  
224.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7,  § 324 (“A special benefit conferred 
on the remaining parcel may not be deducted from the value of the part taken, 
therefore, but it may be deducted from consequential or severance damages.”). 
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benefits may be equal or greater to that of the rest of the 
neighborhood.  
In contrast, opponents of the proposed change advocate for 
an emphasis in the word “just” in just compensation. 225  The 
landowner must be fairly and justly compensated for their loss, 
and should not bear the cost of society’s gain. 226  In addition, 
opponents in Beveridge v. Lewis noted: 
 
The chance that land will increase in value as 
population increases and new facilities for 
transportation and new markets are created is an 
element of value quite generally taken into 
consideration in the purchase of land in estimating 
its present market value. This chance for gain is 
the property of the land-owner. If a part of his 
property is taken for the construction of the 
railway, he stands in reference to the other 
property not taken like similar property-owners in 
the neighborhood. His neighbors are not required 
to surrender this prospective enhancement of value 
in order to secure the increased facilities which the 
railroad will afford.227 
 
In short, everyone in a neighborhood receives the benefit of the 
general benefits, but while neighbors’ property may appreciate in 
value, the same cannot be said of the landowner that lost their 
                                                          
225.  See DellaPelle, supra note 151 (noting the premium paid for 
beachfront properties in the Harvey Cedars case); see also SINGER, supra note 
23, at 677 (highlighting issues of justice and fairness as factors that have been 
considered in prior takings cases).  
226.  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 483 U.S. 104, 148 
(1978) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment's guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”) (quoting 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
227.  Beveridge v. Lewis, 70 P. 1083, 1086 (Cal. 1902), overruled by 
Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 825 
(Cal. 1997) (“On balance, and acknowledging that Continental’s position is not 
without some force, we overrule Beveridge, supra, 137 Cal. 619, to the extent it 
holds that only “special” benefits may be offset against severance damages.”). 
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property to the partial taking.228 As a result, the neighbors get 
the general benefit in addition to the increased value, while the 
condemnee gets merely the increased value.229 However, as the 
California Supreme Court in Continental Development said, this 
argument fails because those neighbors do not also receive the 
severance damages that the condemnee receives, making the 
ultimate difference in benefits received insubstantial.230 
 Opponents against the proposed change have noted that it 
may be difficult to calculate with reasonable certainty the 
positive environmental general benefits.231 If the general benefits 
cannot be calculated non-speculatively, they would not be 
admitted into court, which would lead to the same result as 
before.232 Consequently, there would be no practical change from 
the adoption of the Harvey Cedars decision.233 
 One additional concern that the general benefits of a 
public project may be so great as to entirely offset any 
compensation owed to a condemnee, leaving a landowner with no 
financial recompense. 234  If so, the benefits would unfairly 
foreclose the just compensation award to which the landowner is 
                                                          
228. See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 526–27 (observing the 
protective benefits of the dune creation project and the simultaneous 
disadvantage to those whose property was taken as a result of the project). 
229. See id. (describing the calculation of benefits provided to 
homeowners affected by partial takings). 
230.  See Continental, 941 P.2d 809, 820 (Cal. 1902) (“Continental’s 
equal protection argument is flawed in that it fails to account for a significant 
difference, in terms of the availability of compensation for the detrimental 
effects of the Green Line . . . . Continental is entitled to severance damages, 
whereas its neighbors are not.”). 
231.  See id. at 826 (discussing condemnee’s objection to a somewhat 
vague standard of what is to be considered reasonable). 
232.  See DellaPelle, supra note 151 (“[U]nless and until the benefit 
can be proven, as a reasonably calculable sum by objective market data, the 
mandate of the Karan court will not necessarily lead to lower condemnation 
awards.”). 
233. See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 544 (“[T]he quantifiable 
decrease in the value of their property—loss of view—should have been set off 
by any quantifiable increase in its value—storm-protection benefits. The Karans 
are entitled to just compensation, a reasonable calculation of any decrease in the 
fair market value of their property after the taking.”). 
234.  See Spoto, supra note 123 (noting the Karan’s eventually 
settled for $1 of just compensation). 
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constitutionally entitled.235 If the landowner has their land taken 
from them and receives nothing tangible in return, there is a 
certain unjust quality at play. 236  Although Susette Kelo did 
receive compensation in the Kelo case, she described a similar 
plight to the one just described by stating, “My name is Susette 
Kelo and the government stole my home.”237 A landowner that 
loses part of their property without financial compensation in 
return might feel similarly.  
Despite this possibly unjust nature, the Harvey Cedars 
case eventually settled for $1, far less than the nominal $300 
offered to the Karans.238 As a result, at least one court remains 
satisfied with nominal compensation, despite concerns stated 
above.239 In addition, it should be noted that the Constitution 
does not require just compensation to be paid in monetary forms 
by its very terms; the notion of benefits in itself constitutes 
compensation outside of currency. 240  This is why conceptual, 
although certain, general benefits should be considered and as an 
offset to real damages to the remaining property, because even 
though they are a more ephemeral concept than visible damages, 
general benefits still have real consequences and are 
calculable.241 
 
                                                          
235.  See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 338 (“Special benefits conferred 
on a property owner’s remaining property as a direct result of a taking may 
constitute just compensation”). 
236. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating the constitutional 
prohibition against unjust takings compensation). 
237.  Susette Kelo, The Government Stole My Home, Policy Report, 
31 CATO INSTITUTE (Mar./Apr. 2009), available at http://object.cato.org/policy-
report/marchapril-2009/government-stole-home (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
238. See Spoto, supra note 123 (identifying the insignificant 
settlement amount of the Karan case).  
239. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
240. See AM. JUR., supra note 7, § 338 (“Special benefits conferred 
on a property owner’s remaining property as a direct result of a taking may 
constitute just compensation”). But see Paducah & Memphis R.R. Co. v. Stovall, 
59 Tenn. 1, 5 (1873) (“In the case of Woodfolk v. The Nashville & Chattanooga 
Railroad Co., 2 Swan, 422, it was settled that the ‘just compensation’ of the 
Constitution was the fair value of the land appropriated, which must be actually 
paid in money, and can not be discharged in benefits or ameliorations.”). 
241. See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 544 (N.J. 
2013) (explaining the necessity of using a compensation method that accurately 
identifies general benefits).  
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
Every state and the federal court should adopt the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in Harvey Cedars, which allows 
for just compensation in partial takings to be calculated 
according to the before-and-after method, mitigated by non-
speculative and reasonably calculable general and special 
benefits.242 The applied effect of the change would be to lower 
economic costs for states and municipalities in creating 
environmentally friendly projects that benefit the general 
populace, and to recognize the benefits realized in practice by 
landowners of such projects.243 
In addition, development of partial takings jurisprudence 
would allow the government to be better suited to take 
unpredictable and unforeseeable environmental concerns that 
may pop up in the future, without being forced to rely on property 
law developed in the 1800s, as is the case with Bauman.244 In the 
end, federal, state, and local jurisdictions will be in a better 
financial position to take partial tracts of land for the betterment 
of the public as a whole, in keeping with the fundamental public 
use doctrine that eminent domain demands.245 
 
                                                          
242. See id. at 543 (“The Borough should not have been barred from 
presenting all non-speculative, reasonably calculable benefits from the dune 
project . . . . Those benefits are part of the fair-market equation, regardless of 
whether they are enjoyed by others in the community.”). 
243. See Barnhizer, supra note 190, at 295–97 (discussing the need 
for environmentally motivated takings actions). 
244. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 563 (1897) (applying 
underlying property law principles to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause). 
245. See Barnhizer, supra note 190, at 297–99 (advocating for more 
aggressive takings actions based on the necessity of public planning and 
response to environmental concerns). 
